An economic analysis of the closure of markets and other dysfunctions in the awarding of concession contracts by SAUSSIER, Stéphane
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RSCAS 2013/08 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
Loyola de Palacio Programme on Energy Policy 
An Economic Analysis of the Closure of Markets and 
other Dysfunctions in the Awarding of Concession 
Contracts 
 
Stéphane Saussier 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
European University Institute 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
Loyola de Palacio Programme on Energy Policy 
 
 
 
An Economic Analysis of the Closure of Markets and other 
Dysfunctions in the Awarding of Concession Contracts 
 
  
 Stéphane Saussier 
 
EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2013/08 
 
   
This text may be downloaded only for personal research purposes. Additional reproduction for other 
purposes, whether in hard copies or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s).  
If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the 
working paper, or other series, the year and the publisher. 
 
 
 
ISSN 1028-3625 
© Stéphane Saussier, 2013 
Printed in Italy, February 2013 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 
I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy 
www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ 
www.eui.eu 
cadmus.eui.eu 
  
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), created in 1992 and directed by Stefano 
Bartolini since September 2006, aims to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research and to 
promote work on the major issues facing the process of integration and European society. 
The Centre is home to a large post-doctoral programme and hosts major research programmes and 
projects, and a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The research agenda is organised 
around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, reflecting the changing agenda of European 
integration and the expanding membership of the European Union.  
Details of the research of the Centre can be found on:  
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/ 
Research publications take the form of Working Papers, Policy Papers, Distinguished Lectures and 
books. Most of these are also available on the RSCAS website:  
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ 
The EUI and the RSCAS are not responsible for the opinion expressed by the author(s).  
Loyola de Palacio Energy Policy Chair 
The Loyola de Palacio Energy Policy Chair was created in October 2008 at the RSCAS in honour of 
Loyola de Palacio, former Vice President of the European Commission and Commissioner for Energy 
and Transportation in the Prodi Commission. It promotes research in the area of energy policy. It is 
funded by contributions from donors. Professor Jean-Michel Glachant is the holder of the Chair. 
  
The Chair focuses on the fields of energy economics, law, regulation, as well as geo-politics. It 
addresses topics such as the achievement of the EU internal energy market; sustainable energy 
systems and the environment; energy security of supply; the EU model of energy regulation; the EU 
energy competition policy; the EU policy towards carbon free energy systems in 2050. 
  
The series of working papers aims at disseminating the work of academics on the above-mentioned 
energy policy issues. 
  
For further information 
Loyola de Palacio Energy Policy Chair 
Nicole Ahner (scientific coordinator) 
Email contact: Nicole.Ahner@eui.eu 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
European University Institute 
Via delle Fontanelle, 19 
I-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Fax: +39055 4685755 
http://www.loyola-de-palacio-chair.eu 
  
Abstract 
Because concession contracts are long-term agreements that are inherently incomplete, the economic 
literature suggests that rigid award rules are inadequate. We suggest that the Directive should contain a 
right mix of flexible and rigid rules, as well as procedures to increase transparency and accountability 
of contracting parties. This briefing note provides suggestions in order to avoid the closure of markets 
and other dysfunctions in the award of concession contracts. 
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1. Introduction* 
Community law does not provide a general definition of concessions nor does it lay down specific 
rules to apply to this form of public-private partnership (with the exception of work concessions, to 
which certain rules of Directive 2004/18/EC on public procurement apply). Furthermore, Member 
States regulate the awarding of concessions contracts in a variety of ways, ranging from an absence of 
regulation to the application of detailed public procurement rules. This situation has led to some 
fragmentation and uncertainty about the scope of the application of the rules in this field. The 
perceived lack of transparency of concession markets across the EU is expected to result in significant 
inefficiencies and market dysfunction (e.g., corruption, collusion, closure of markets). 
This note provides a comprehensive framework, specifying the strengths and pitfalls of public 
private partnerships (PPPs), focusing more specifically on concession contracts. We will build on 
theoretical developments of contract theories, and more specifically of transaction cost economics 
(Williamson 1985), that provides a lens  through which advantages and drawbacks of PPPs can be 
assessed.  
We will not discuss extensively what is or should be the definition of a concession contract or a 
PPP. The notion of PPP is multifaceted and covers a wide diversity of contractual agreements 
characterized by different risk-sharing and financing schemes, as well as different organizational 
forms from Management contracts to Private Finance Initiatives (OECD 2008). A broad definition of 
PPPs now widely accepted is that they are long-term contractual agreements between a private 
operator / company (or a consortium) and a public entity (both at the central or local level) under 
which a service is provided, generally with related investments (Saussier et al. 2009). Concession 
contracts are also generally characterized by the fact that the private operator bears the demand risk. 
This is a crucial point, as will become clear in this note. 
In this note, we will highlight the problems associated with the awarding of concession contracts 
(section 2). We will argue that complex long-term contracts, such as concessions contracts, are 
inherently incomplete leading to contractual difficulties that are referred to “transaction costs” in the 
economic literature. Those transaction costs are sometimes important enough to offset the benefits of 
concession contracts and should not be considered as minor costs. Especially when considering that 
setting up effective “rules of the game” for those contracts as the Directive seeks. Then we will turn to 
potential solutions identified by the economic literature in order to limit transaction costs (section 3). 
As we will see, different award procedures are possible and solutions exist. However, this is not a free 
lunch as the economic literature suggests flexible rules and increased transparency as well as ex post 
monitoring. Finally, we discuss the implications of a Directive on concession contracts (Section 4) 
before concluding (section 5). 
2. Problems Associated with the Awarding of Concession Contracts 
Concession contracts are complex long-term agreements. Because economic actors are supposed to be 
characterized by private agendas and bounded rationality, these contracts are inherently incomplete in 
the sense that they do not specify what the contracting parties should do in every future situation. This 
characteristic is not specific to concession contracts. Complex agreements also exist in traditional 
procurement. But long-term complex agreements are more the exception than the rule in traditional 
public procurements. Because of their complexity and their duration, concession contracts are clearly 
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more prone to uncertainty and contractual incompleteness.  This contractual incompleteness generates 
transaction costs – i.e. difficulties in implementing and enforcing these contracts. The magnitude of 
the transaction costs differs, depending on how the concessions are awarded. 
2.1. Uncertainty and Cost of Participation in Call for Tenders 
The normal manner of awarding a concession contract is through a call for tenders in order to promote 
competition. The efficiency of the competitive bidding process depends primarily on the ability of the 
buyer to accurately specify his needs. Indeed, if the buyer does not succeed, the potential bidders may 
be discouraged from participating in the call for tenders because of the costs of searching for 
information that should be borne to respond. Because of the complexity and long-term duration of 
many concession contracts – especially when specific investments1 are needed – the public authorities’ 
task is not easy. Indeed, they must usually consider not only the quantitative criteria, such as the 
proposed price, but also the more qualitative criteria such as durability, safety, environmental impact, 
aesthetics, social criteria and so on. Many questions arise for public authorities: what criteria should 
we use in order to award contracts? How do we order them if necessary? How do we compare bids 
incorporating both quantitative and qualitative dimensions? Thus, the specifications of the contract, or 
the determination of what is expected of the selected operator, are not easy, which can result in a 
prohibitive cost carrier selection for public authorities, and prohibitive cost participation for operators.  
Just to give few examples of the magnitude of these costs: 
 in their work on the reform of British Rail, (Preston et al. 2000) estimated that the median cost 
for the candidates to respond to a tender was £ 0.75 million.  
 In France, in the urban public transport sector, the fund to promote competition that was recently 
established in consideration of the acceptance of the merger between two major operators 
(Veolia and Transdev in March 2011) provides for compensation of unsuccessful applicants 
between 50,000 and 300,000 euros, depending on the turnover of the candidate.  
 Furthermore, a study of the UK National Audit Office (NAO 2003) indicates that: "The 
procurement of PFI deals is inherently more complex than the procurement of conventional 
deals and can involve departments and bidders in heavy administrative costs. For example, on 
the Newcastle Estate deal (19th Report, Session 1999-2000), the cost of the procurement to the 
Department of Social Security rose from an initial estimate of £0.4 million to £4.4 million [about 
2 percent of the discounted contract value], an eleven-fold increase, reflecting the complexity of 
this type of procurement and the Department’s inability to undertake many of the tasks required 
to negotiate the deal. On the Prime deal to transfer the Department of Social Security estate to 
the private sector (41st Report, Session 1998-99), the Department’s costs totalled £ 10.9 million, 
compared with an initial budget of £ 1.7 million, and the final three bidders spent around £ 27 
million in preparing their bids.” (UK National Audit Office, Delivering better value for money 
from the Private Finance Initiative, June 2003).  
 In the same line, the English National Audit Office (NAO) stated in June 2004: “London 
Underground had always understood that it would be expensive to negotiate such large and 
complex deals and in February 1999 budgeted to spend £ 150 million. The outturn was £ 180 
million (£ 170 million in 1999 prices). In addition, having decided to reimburse bidders’ costs, 
London Underground agreed to add £ 57 million to the total deal to cover bidders’ costs up to 
the point of selecting preferred bidders. London Underground required the preferred bidders to 
disclose the level of bid costs they intended to recover from the service charge. After prolonged 
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 Asset specificity is the extent to which the investments made to support a particular transaction have a higher value to 
that transaction than they would have if they were redeployed for any other purpose (Williamson 1985). One 
consequence of specific investment is that contracting partners are in a lock-in relationship that usually impedes the use 
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negotiations the accepted level amounted to a further £ 218 million of bidders’ costs and fees. In 
total 275 million of bidders’ costs are reimbursed. As they were based mainly on output 
specifications rather than inputs, the costs of the program could only be known when firm bids 
came in. It was then that the Department came to realize that the total costs falling on the 
taxpayer were far more than those considered affordable. There followed a review of the 
specification to reduce the total cost of the program. The review and the subsequent re-bidding 
added some five months to the process therefore increasing costs.” (UK National Audit Office, 
London Underground PPP: Were they good deals? June 2004).
2
 
Inaccurate specification of what the public authority is expecting, that is to say of the terms of the 
contract, may also deter potential candidates from participating in the auction because of the fear of 
the contract being renegotiated by an opportunistic public authority (Zupan 1989a; Zupan 1989b).  
Uncertainties may therefore affect the expected benefits of the competitive tendering, firstly, 
because it reduces the number of bidders and, secondly, because this may lead applicants to include 
high risk premiums in their bids.  
2.2. Uncertainty and Adverse Selection 
Award procedures are supposed to be framed in order to select the best offer and hence the best 
partner for providing the public service. However, award procedures are also subject to adverse 
selection problems that can lead the public authority to selecting a bad partner. 
2.2.1. Low-balling Strategy 
Firstly, once the operator is selected and the concession contract is signed, the relationship between 
the public authority and the incumbent is a one of bilateral monopoly. There is no longer any 
competition. This bilateral dependence creates hold-up opportunities for both contracting parties that 
may be reflected in costly renegotiations that are unjustified from a social perspective. Since 
concession contracts are incomplete, there is always room for renegotiations and thus, they cannot be 
excluded. As we will argue later, renegotiations in concession contracts are the rule, not the exception. 
The important point is that these potential opportunistic renegotiations may affect the effectiveness of 
the competitive bidding ex ante. Indeed, if the suppliers anticipate such renegotiations that allow them 
to avoid ex post losses, they are encouraged to submit abnormally low offers through low-balling 
strategies – i.e. offers containing promises that will be difficult to keep, for the sole purpose of 
winning the contract. Thus, the operator who has the best capacity to lobby and to renegotiate the 
contract will probably win the tender even though he is not the most efficient candidate (Engel et al. 
2009). As a result, this possibility would not place the public authority in a comfortable ex post 
situation. 
Both newspaper articles and academic empirical studies suggest that this is a common phenomenon 
in developed countries and in developing countries. For example, the French newspaper Le Monde of 
November 9, 2011 stated that: "Low-balling strategies take the lead in the wing" on the occasion of the 
signature of a charter between the French Building Federation and the Association of French Mayors 
in order to detect and treat abnormally low tenders in public procurement. The charter follows the 
observation that "the abnormally low tenders have become legion in the construction industry" and 
recommends a mathematical method to attempt to detect them from the average of the bids received. It 
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is recommended to reject tenders 20% higher than this average”.3 Guasch suggests that this 
phenomenon is also very common in developing countries (J.-L. Guasch 2004). Looking at 1,300 
infrastructure concessions contracts signed between 1985 and 2000 in Latin America, he noted that 
50% of road concessions and 70% of water contracts are renegotiated on average two years after their 
signature. This is a strong signal to the author that offers made by the operators are not real 
commitments (see box 1). 
 
Box 1. Renegotiations in Concessions are the rule not the exception 
The study by J-L Guasch is based on the analysis of 1,300 infrastructure concessions signed 
between 1980 and 2003 in Latin American countries and the Caribbean (Guasch (2004)). To 
our knowledge, this study is the one that is based on the largest number of concessions. 
 % of renegotiated 
contracts 
Average time before 
renegotiation (in years) 
All sectors combined 42% 2.1 
Electricity 10% 2.3 
Transport 57% 3.1 
Water 75% 1.7 
In addition to the frequency, the dimensions of the contracts impacted by renegotiations were 
also analysed. 
 % of contracts negotiated resulting in 
Relaxation of the time frame 69% 
Reduction of the time frame 18% 
Increase of charges 62% 
Reduction of charges 19% 
Increase in the number of components with automatic 
“pass-through” by increasing charges 
 
59% 
Extension of the concession period 38% 
 
Other less exhaustive studies showed that renegotiations are also the rule in industrialized countries. In 
a recent report, (Engel et al. 2011) note that in the case of transport concessions signed since 1991 in 
the United States “six out of twenty projects have undergone a major change in the initial contractual 
agreement, favouring the concessionaire, and two additional projects have pending renegotiations” 
(Engel and al (2011), page 11).  
With regard to France, the study by (Athias & Stéphane Saussier 2007) found that approximately 
50% of the French motorway concession contracts experienced substantial renegotiations. A more 
recent study, on parking concessions in France concludes that contracts are renegotiated about once 
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every two and a half years (Brux et al. 2011). An important conclusion of this last study is that the 
frequency of renegotiations does not seem to reflect disagreements between the contracting parties 
since it does not affect the probability of the contracts to be renewed once they have ended. This 
suggests that if renegotiation is the rule in concession contracts, they should not always be considered 
bad news (i.e. the result of opportunistic behaviours) and can also be good news (i.e. the partnership 
nature of the contract leading parties to adapt their cooperation as soon as uncertainties are resolved).  
However, the problem with renegotiations is that they potentially undo the advantages of competitive 
bidding for awarding contracts.  
2.2.2. Winner’s Curse 
The award process may also be subject to another problem of adverse selection when the uncertainty 
about future demand or future operating conditions (even when expectations of the public authorities 
are clearly defined) is high. Indeed, this uncertainty is not usually evaluated in the same way by the 
participants in the tender (Common Value Auctions). It is then possible that the introduction of 
competition through competitive tendering will lead to retaining the most optimistic candidate, not the 
most effective one. This is the so-called "winner's curse effect" because the selected operator is the 
one that will probably go bankrupt ex post, placing the public authority in difficulty.  
Since competitors are usually smart enough to anticipate this problem, their interest is to internalize 
this winner's curse effect by bidding less aggressively when the number of competitors is increased. 
This is what is demonstrated in the study by (Hong & Shum 2002). Figure 1 below shows that for the 
highway work auctions, the average simulated winning bid is generally increasing in n, indicating that 
procurement costs would raise if the government invites more competitors. 
Fig. 1. Value of the bids and number of bidders for highway work auctions 
 
Source: (Hong & Shum 2002), page 890. 
(Athias & Nunez 2008) also highlight the internalization of the winner's curse in a study of 49 
contracts awarded in toll road concessions worldwide. The authors show, from the relative difference 
between the traffic forecasts included in the winning bids and actual traffic observed, that operators 
are bidding less aggressively when they expect strong competition (i.e, they incorporate a risk 
premium based on the number of bidders in order to avoid the winner's curse). However, they also 
show that this behavior is less pronounced in countries with a weak institutional framework allowing 
easy renegotiation if the contracts. They therefore also highlight the opportunistic behavior of 
suppliers.  
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Of course, for a project with no common value problems, the higher the number of competitors, the 
better it is (See (Engel et al. 2011) and (Amaral et al 2012)). 
Internalization of the winner's curse thus challenges the interest of open competitive bidding to the 
extent that a limited number of suppliers or a bilateral negotiation, sometimes allow the public 
authority to obtain more interesting bids. 
2.3. Collusion, Favouritism and Lack of Competition 
Regardless of the difficulties associated with the complexity and uncertainty of the projects, the award 
procedures are not immune to the risks of agreements between competitors or between public 
authorities and applicants taking the form of favoritism. We briefly discuss these issues. However it 
should be noted that they are not specific to concession contracts. Indeed, many decisions from the 
national competition authorities regarding these issues concern traditional procurement contracts.
4
 
2.3.1. Collusive Agreements 
When a call for tenders is frequent, competitors may be tempted to agree on the price of their bids or 
proposals for their service specifications. The agreements may also cover the market shares of each 
candidate when the auction focuses on different objects. Competitors may also attempt to deter an 
operator from participating in the proceedings or to convince him to withdraw. In all cases, the 
development of cooperative agreements between competitors reduces the actual degree of competition 
in the bidding procedures, leading to higher prices for the public authority and hence for consumers. 
2.3.2. Favoritism 
The fact that public officials are not all benevolent and insensitive to corruption subjects the award 
procedures to the risks of capture and favoritism. This is true when public officials possess substantial 
discretion because there are no rules constraining award procedures. It is also true when procedures 
are enforced because favoritism may then take the form of specific criteria put forward in order to 
select the right candidate. In any case, favouritism can also take the form of national protectionism. 
Such behaviour distorts competition. The opening of concession awards markets throughout EU can 
contribute to improving competition and is one challenge the Directive should address. 
3. Potential Solutions  
3.1. Thinking about the Award Criteria 
Adverse selection appears as a recurring problem with which the public authorities are struggling to 
cope with. How to select the best competitor? Or more modestly, an efficient and trusty one? One way 
may reside in the award criteria, that can be more complete and rigid, or that might incorporate other 
elements than purely economic ones. 
3.1.1. Multi-Criteria Auctions 
One intuitive solution, suggested by the literature, is to explicitly take into account quantitative and 
qualitative aspects in the evaluation of tenders. With the objective to define all criteria that are relevant 
as much as possible. Nevertheless, some empirical studies on the subject point out abuses to which it 
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leads. From data on road and railway concessions in Latin America, (Estache et al. 2009) show that, 
firstly, the use of the multi-criteria auction significantly increases the risk of renegotiation of contracts 
and, secondly, this type of auction is often chosen for non-economic reasons, and is thus diverted from 
its original purpose. Moreover, when the criteria for selecting candidates to participate in an auction 
are numerous but are not clearly expressed, the adjudicator has a wide discretion and candidates can 
hardly anticipate the outcome of the selection process. To address this uncertainty, they may be 
tempted to bribe, influence or pressure the authorities to encourage them to use their discretionary 
margins in a manner favorable to them.  
3.1.2. Reputation as a Criteria 
Another possibility would be to recognize that completeness of criteria as well as complete contracting 
is not attainable, leading to the need to renegotiate ex post. It would then be natural to select bidders 
that would more likely behave as a fair partner when it is time to renegotiate. This would suggest that 
the reputation of the candidates must be considered in the procedure (this can be viewed as a particular 
type of multi-criteria auction), where the past performance of a company is used to evaluate its current 
offer.
5
 If the legislation in the United States encourages the establishment of databases on the 
evaluation of past performance of companies in public contracts and the sharing of this information, 
the EU Directives, in contrast, go in the opposite direction as it is noted by  (Spagnolo 2012). 
Pacini and Spagnolo [2011] studied the effect of introducing a rating system of the past 
performance of providers, prices of public services provided by private operators, as well as more 
qualitative dimension offers. They analyzed an Italian public company that manages both the sales and 
distribution of energy, water services as well as public lighting; it outsources about 300 million € / 
year of its activity. In September 2007, a scoring system that rewards past performance by the granting 
of a bonus when awarding a new contract was introduced. The mechanism was announced and 
presented several times in order to inform potential operators. The results found by the authors suggest 
that if the mechanism is neutral on prices, it still allows to increase the quality and safety of services 
(which are valued at the total of 134 criteria by auditors). 
(Bajari et al. 2009) reach the same kind of conclusions. Using a data set of contracts awarded in the 
building construction industry in Northern California from 1995-2001 by private authorities, they 
found that more complex projects – for which ex ante design is hard to complete and ex post 
adaptations are expected – are more likely to be negotiated, while simpler projects are awarded 
through competitive bidding. Furthermore, buyers rely on past performance and reputation to select a 
contractor when they decide to award the contract through direct negotiations. This suggests leaving 
open the possibility to negotiate to a certain extent especially for concessions that are complex and 
may not rely automatically on weighted criteria to define the best economic offer. 
3.1.3. Finding the Optimal Level of Transparency 
It seems that when combined with increased transparency, the contracting authorities' discretionary 
margins are more used to providing economic efficiency. It is not surprising. As transparency 
increases, economic actors have access to information, enabling them to achieve better control of the 
probity of the process. The virtues of transparency have also been demonstrated on other dimensions 
of the competitive bidding: one study shows that disclosure of the estimated project cost would reduce 
the prediction error and would provide better calibrated offers.  
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 People reluctant to accepting the idea of introducing reputation criteria in the call for tenders often argue that it would 
close the market to the happy few already in. However, such criteria could be introduced giving a maximum reputation 
score to newcomers instead of considering a process where companies have to show a good track record before being 
considered reliable. 
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 On the one hand, the bids received, after communication to the candidates of the estimated price, 
would reduce the average value of offers (De Silva et al. 2009). 
 On the other hand, it would improve the survival of new entrants, more exposed, reducing the 
problems of winner's curse that they are more specifically exposed to. New entrants benefit 
primarily from the effects of diffusion of the estimated price, as it reduces information 
asymmetries between experienced and inexperienced candidates (De Silva et al. 2009). 
However, more transparency is not always safe. This might be seen as a paradox. To understand why, 
it must be kept in mind that the award of concession contracts is generally concerning few – potential 
– competitors.6 This is because, as previously noted, such contracts generally involve high 
investments. Therefore, because we are talking about concentrated markets, collusion can be easier 
when more information is provided to competitors. As noted by the French Competition Authority 
(2000), "the publication of a priori selection criteria and prioritization [...] may have anti-competitive 
effects. [...] Having to inform bidders about the selection criteria is particularly likely to facilitate 
agreements [because] precise "rules of the game" known in advance by bidders makes the conditions 
under which the contract will be award readable for them” (Competition Council [2000], p. 7). Clear 
rules of the games, where the public authority would specify their criteria, their weight, and the way 
they will evaluate tenders ex ante, could promote collusion.  
3.2. Thinking about Contractual Choices 
As highlighted in the discussion above, while there is a clear need for maintaining flexibility in the 
award procedure, making room for the public authorities’ discretion, there is also a clear need to 
structure this flexibility so as to limit as much as possible the potentially, very high costs it may imply, 
particularly if abused.  
3.2.1. Ex post Renegotiations 
As a general principle, post-award contractual changes should be avoided as much as possible; they 
should be rare and exceptional events. 
One general and somewhat obvious principle of contract design that may help soften this trade-off 
is trying to include clauses for all anticipated potential changes in the original contract. In summary, it 
tries to ‘make the contract as complete as possible’, taking into account the cost of writing a complex 
contract that details many possible contingencies from which only few will effectively be realized. 
Although investments in contract design that regulate potential changes are welcome, a complete 
contract is not something that is attainable in a 50-year long contractual relationship. The complexity 
and long-term horizon typical of concession contracts are bound to make any such contract incomplete 
and subject to requests for changes linked to unanticipated events. Moreover, the contractual 
provisions for anticipated changes may easily become obsolete over time, and their adaptation may 
become necessary in the light of unexpected major technological changes. In other terms, trying to 
build a complete and rigid contract might lead, in reality, to trapping the contracting parties in a bad 
and rigid contract, that should be renegotiated.
7
 In this context, post-award contract changes, 
renegotiation, and contract completion can be efficient means to address issues arising from contract 
incompleteness, and so they should not be ruled out. The challenge for contract design is then to 
identify and support efficiency-improving contract revisions. 
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systems) is a way to diffuse ex ante information that may increase the number of bidders – by opening European markets 
to foreign competitors – and reduce this transparency paradox.  
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 A recent report states that many PFI contracts signed in the UK are now renegotiated because initial agreements are too 
rigid (House of Commons 2011). 
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Since a revision may lead to ex ante undesirable outcomes, such as rent shifting and politically-
motivated investments, the contracts may be designed to establish principles and procedures to rule the 
revisions if the parties call for them. The literature provides useful insights on how contract design can 
ensure that future renegotiations will contribute to achieving the initial contractual objectives. Contract 
design can have much to do with renegotiation (influencing its occurrence and outcomes) not only 
because it can directly affect the contract characteristics determining the degree of incompleteness and 
the likelihood of revisions (as documented by (J. L. Guasch et al. 2008)), but also because it can 
require compulsory and structured renegotiation processes, involving many people and not only the 
contracting parties, that limit the scope for abuse. 
In this regard, the initial contract should address as clearly as possible: 
 The circumstances that justify tariff and output adjustments, 
 When and how to implement benchmarking and market testing to test the value for money of the 
proposed changes, 
 The circumstances under which the contracting parties are entitled to call for a more general 
contract renegotiation, 
 Specific principles and procedures to rule the revision. 
One also has to be sure that the shock that is justifying the amendment of the initial contract is really 
unanticipated, exceptional, and independent of the private partner’s efforts before moving to a costly 
renegotiation. The risk disrupts the entire procurement process by favouring private partners that are 
unable to anticipate shocks or act so as to minimize their impact, i.e. less able private partners, and by 
selecting their overly aggressive offers – which are probably cheap because they do not efficiently 
anticipate the possible shocks – rather than more appropriate and expensive ones. 
3.2.2. Contract Duration 
Contractual innovations may also be used in order to limit the need for renegotiation linked to 
optimistic offers (Winner’s curse) and to facilitate renegotiations and eventual breach of contracts. 
One potential innovation, already tested in several contracts, consists in organizing a call for tenders 
based on the least present value of revenue necessary for competitors over the duration of the contract 
(Engel et al. 1997). Such an award mechanism based on bids for the least present value of revenue 
(LPVR) eliminates the risk of demand and simplifies renegotiations. It provides a means to ensure the 
provider against commercial risks because the duration of the contract continuously adapts to future 
demand faced by the operator (i.e. if demand is low, the duration of the contract will increase). See 
box 2 below.  
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Box 2. Flexible-term Contracts 
 
In a LPVR auction, the duration of the contract is not fixed from the outset, although a 
maximum duration may be specified by contract: the contract is awarded to the firm that asks 
for the smallest accumulated user fee revenue in discounted value, or what the authors call the 
Present-Value-of Revenue (PVR). The contract stops when the PVR the parties contracted on is 
reached. Thus, in the example illustrated by the graph below, concerning a project that requires 
a construction phase (which is not necessarily always the case), depending on whether the 
service provided by the operator meets high, average or low demand, discounted revenues 
differ. The duration of the contract fits this situation with an end in T1, T0 or the maximum 
length of contract as appropriate. By tying the length of the concession to the demand associated 
with the project, this type of contract compensates for the risk. If there is a high demand, user 
fee revenue would accrue rapidly and the duration of the concession would be shorter than if the 
demand is lower. This clearly reduces the risk of the project and the required risk premium. This 
would also reduce opportunistic behaviors – leading to opportunistic renegotiations. 
 
Those contracts also have other advantages. As noted by (Kaufmann et al. 2010), “it is easier to 
buy back the project if it becomes necessary to do so, because the uncollected revenue (minus 
reasonable expenses for operations and maintenance) define a fair compensation”. The authors 
note that such flexible-term contracts using PVR auctions became the standard since 2008, in 
Chile, to auction highway contracts. 
Such a way of awarding a contract has been used to a certain extent in the Viaduc de Millau 
concession in France. The concession contract signed in 2001 was supposed to remain in effect for a 
period of 78 years and 2 months. The parties implemented a system of early termination of the 
concession: The State can therefore request the end of the concession without any compensation after 
2045, if the actual discounted cumulative turnover is over three hundred seventy-five million euros. 
This procedure was also used in the case of the Lusoponte concession contract awarded by the 
Portuguese Government to finance, design, build and operate two bridges over the Tagus in Lisbon, 
Portugal (de Lemos et al. 2004). The Lusoponte contract was signed in 1994. The concession was 
originally to expire at the earliest on 24 March 2028 or at a total cumulative traffic flow of 2250 
million vehicles. 
It is important to note that such a contractual provision is problematic in the sense that, implicitly, 
it is simply a move from traffic-based concessions towards “availability-based concessions”. In 
availability-based contracts, the public authority retains the commercial risk: it perceives commercial 
revenue but makes payments to the concessionaire based on performance indicators. In traffic-based 
concessions, the concessionaire bears the commercial risk and does not receive payments from the 
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public authority during the operating years. Depending on the definition of a concession contract 
retained by the Directive, such contractual agreements, shifting the commercial risk to the hands of the 
public authority might be considered as public private partnerships instead of concessions… 
3.3. Thinking about Ex Post Regulation 
Another basic principle is that, given their potential negative effects on governance and efficiency, 
renegotiations should be extremely open and transparent procedures. There is no doubt that 
renegotiations lead to a win-win game between contracting parties. However, one party is usually not 
invited during the renegotiation process: the consumers of the public service concerned by the 
contract. To improve on transparency, the contract may envisage calling a third party, e.g. an 
arbitrator, an independent commission, or a group of experts, to evaluate the case and try to conciliate 
the needs of both parties without inflicting too much harm on the consumers. This point was already 
highlighted in section 3.1. suggesting that the contractual agreements should frame how and when 
parties will renegotiate, involving all the concerned parties. To limit discretion and disagreement, the 
contract may also provide a limit as to the amount that can be renegotiated without calling for a new 
tendering process as suggested in the Directive. However this is a risky strategy for long-term 
concession contracts that might be significantly impacted by uncertainty during the duration of their 
life. However, in order to be effective such contractual principles should be enforced.  
On the one hand, it is hard to believe that such principles, once suggested by the Directive would 
be automatically put in place. Box 3 below shows that European countries are not on an equal line. We 
suggest that considering only an ex post contractual governance is a risky strategy (i.e. letting the 
public authority solely regulate ex post adaptations). 
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Box 3. Control of Corruption: a Comparison Between European Countries 
The graph below shows how widespread the control of corruption in European countries is. This 
indicator, developed by the World Bank, captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of 
the state by elites and private interests. 
 
 
Source: (Kaufmann et al. 2010) 
Note: The governance indicators presented here aggregate the views on the quality of governance provided by a large number of 
enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. These data are gathered from a number of 
survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations. The WGI do not reflect the official views 
of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. The WGI are not used by the World Bank Group to allocate 
resources. 
However there is no reason to think that a regulatory body would automatically improve contractual 
habits and reduce the overall risk of corruption that is an issue more directly connected to police and 
rules of law. The cost of running such structure would also be very high. 
An intermediate way would be to consider an ex post contractual governance with the obligation 
for the parties to inform citizens every year about information such as renegotiations, price evolution, 
investments, quality of the services … This could take the form of an annual mandatory report 
providing information on how public services have been awarded and how they are managed and with 
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what results. Such a way of doing would allow citizens to access data, may be electronically, and put 
pressure on public authorities increasing their accountability.
8
  An annual report to the European 
commission could also be envisaged in order to follow improvements that are made by the Union. 
Such ex post information would complete ex ante information envisioned by the Directive (i.e. 
Electronic e-procurement bidding systems and award results – Annex 5 of the Directive). Those points 
are crucial to benchmark results obtained more easily than it is the case now. 
4. Implications for the Directive 
Many questions arise with the idea to frame a Directive for concession contracts. Some answers can be 
given in the viewpoint of the economics of contracts and transaction cost economics as well as 
considering what we know from experience and existing empirical studies. 
4.1. Do we need a Directive for Concession Contracts? 
Do we need a Directive for concession contracts? The main effect of a Directive would be to frame the 
“rules of the game” in order to avoid direct negotiations, corruption behaviours and to foster 
competition as much as possible.  
  
                                                     
8
 This idea is very similar to what has been in place in France since 1995, with the so-called loi Barnier. The 1995 Barnier 
Law set up the principle of an annual report to inform users. In each public service, whether it is run under direct public 
management or through concession, the mayor of the municipality or president of the inter-municipal structure must 
elaborate an annual report on the price and quality of the service, with specific information on work done, underway or 
planned, as well as on debt. The report is then presented to the deciding assembly, after which it is made available to the 
general public. In addition, if the service is delegated, the operator must also write up an annual report on how the 
contract has been met, including accounts for each of the operations linked to fulfilling the contract, an analysis of the 
quality of the service provided and the conditions for implementation of the public service. 
Stéphane Saussier 
14 
Box 4. The French Sapin Law: What is the Impact?  
 
Since 1993, a new law in France regulates concession contracts («loi Sapin», January 29th, 1993). 
This law reflects the willingness to reduce powers entitled and exerted by local authorities 
organizing economic life. More precisely, this law restricts freedom of contracting for fear of forms 
of corruption. The main rules of the game implemented by this law are the following: 
Local authorities decide to organize the public service through direct public management or not. 
This decision remains in their hands. 
If they decide to use a concession contract, there is an obligation to organize a call for tenders 
The announcement of criteria used in order to select offers is not an obligation. However, an 
announcement is widely given by local authorities when this is possible. 
After offers are received, public authorities may negotiate with one or several selected bidders  
 
This law is mainly concerned with the award procedure and is not very far from what is proposed 
in the Directive. It would be interesting to evaluate its impact on concession contracts and their 
efficiency. 
To our knowledge, only one study tried to assess the effect of this law, using data coming from the 
French water distribution services (Guérin-Schneider & al 2003). Considering the 1998-2001 
period and focusing on new contracts signed, they found several interesting results: 
- Prices decreased on average: - 8%  
- Prices decreased on average for big municipalities (>10 000): -15% 
This suggests that organizing calls for tenders fosters competition and decreases prices paid by the 
consumers. This effect seems to be higher for big municipalities, probably because they are more 
able to organize competition and they are considered more attractive compared to small ones by 
private operators. 
However,  
- The average number of offers is ~2,2 
- The % of renewed incumbent: 90% 
This suggests that even if the Sapin Law had positive effects on prices, competition could still be 
reinforced. One way to reinforce competition would be to elaborate common rules of the game at 
the European level, for foreign competitors to enter into the game. This is precisely what the 
Directive is seeking for. 
However, the theory also suggests that regulating such contracts is not a free ride because strategic 
behaviours might still exist with a Directive. 
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4.2. Do we need a Specific Directive 
Do we need a specific Directive for concession contracts, different from the one concerning traditional 
public procurement? I believe that the answer, looking at theoretical developments concerning public 
contracts, is clearly yes. The theory provides us with a wide range of arguments to justify different 
award procedures based on the idea that concession contracts are considered to be conceptually 
different from public contracts and so should not be subject to similar award rules. Concession 
contracts are more complex and characterized by a higher level of uncertainty especially because they 
are generally (very) long-term agreements. However, it is fair to say that there is a continuum between 
public contracts and concession contracts (or with other kind of PPPs) regarding their complexity and 
uncertainty. It can be argued that some public contracts are also very complex and uncertain. But 
while high level of complexity, uncertainty and contract duration is an exception for public contracts, 
it is the rule for concession contracts, and this justifies a specific Directive for these agreements. 
4.3. What kind of Specific Directive? 
What kind of Directive do we need? A light and flexible one? Or a heavy and rigid one? On the one 
hand, the need for a Directive is clearly coming from the need to establish clear rules of the game in 
order to reduce the discretionary power of public authorities. On the other hand, concession contracts 
are complex and inherently incomplete, leading to many difficulties when organizing calls for tenders.  
The risk here is to consider only the visible iceberg part of concession contracts, focusing only on 
the award process. Such an error would lead to the conclusion that establishing rigid rules of the 
games for calls for tenders would fix many of the problems. Still, as already extensively discussed, 
rigid rules will not resolve important issues. In addition, the efficiency of concession contracts is to be 
considered looking at their entire life, that is to say focusing on the award process and their ex-post 
enforcement.  
The theory and facts suggest that there is no point establishing rigid rules for award procedures: it 
would not ensure fair competition between competitors and it would not favour efficiency of 
concession contracts because actors anticipate that such contracts are generally renegotiated ex post. 
Rigidifying renegotiations ex post is not a solution. It would stick partners in bad deals as soon as 
contracts are misaligned with their environment, as will invariably happen. In their study on 
construction contracts and maintenance of highways in California,  show that candidates anticipate the 
fact that contracts are incomplete in their proposals (especially if they are rigid and framed in order to 
avoid renegotiations) and they found out that the risk premiums by applicants to cover potential costs 
of adapting contracts represent on average 10% of the total value of their offerings. 
The theory and facts suggest that it is clever to establish light rules for award procedures, 
permitting the use, to a certain extent, of public authority’s discretionary power. However, to avoid 
problems the Directive initially tries to mitigate, it is also necessary to recognize the need for ex post 
enforcement of these contracts. This does not mean that a rigid framework is needed at the 
enforcement stage (i.e. forbidding renegotiations) but that a flexible framework, coupled with a need 
for more transparency is needed to permit flexibility without strategic behaviours.  
This position has one consequence: renegotiations should be avoided as much as possible but 
should also be widely accepted when necessary. All this should be framed ex ante and be as 
transparent as possible ex post. An independent authority implicated in the renegotiation process could 
ensure this. With a minimum level of transparency, this would ensure that the consumers’ point of 
view is taken into account and would also reduce contracting parties ability to collude. This is the 
solution suggested by (Engel et al. 2011). More precisely, the authors suggest that “The internal 
structure of the public works authority of state and local governments should be split between a unit 
responsible for planning, project selection, and awarding projects, and an independent unit 
responsible for contract enforcement and the supervision of contract renegotiations” (page 7). Such a 
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division of responsibilities would leave less possibility for corruption and avoid the temptation for 
governments to weaken the enforcement of contracts in exchange for better relationships with private 
firms. 
The main road to follow is to implement a transparent and fair renegotiation process within the 
contractual agreement. Transparency can be met by mandatory annual reports for every public service, 
regardless of how they are provided to the citizens (i.e. independently of the fact that they are provided 
by a public or a private entity).  Such transparency would generate pressure on the public authority as 
well as on private operators increasing their accountability. An example can be provided by the case of 
newly renegotiated water contracts in France. Following many critics concerning the way water 
contracts are governed in France, contractual innovations are developed. Some of them can be through 
as an attempt to regulate the ex post enforcement of the contractual agreements (See Box 5). 
Box 5. New generation of contracts in the French water sector: the case of Dijon 
In 2012, the Greater Dijon (a geographical area regrouping the city of Dijon and other municipalities) 
and Lyonnaise des Eaux renegotiated their initial water contracts. They developed a new governance 
system for water and confirmed their water and wastewater contracts until 2021. 
At the press conference held on 6 January, François Rebsamen, Chairman of the Greater Dijon 
Council, said: “We entered into productive negotiations with Lyonnaise des Eaux on the long-term 
water and wastewater contracts concluded in 1991 and renegotiated in 2001. We will continue our 
partnership until they end in 2021 on a “win-win” basis benefitting both the specialist water 
management operator and the local authority. The productivity gains will primarily enable us to set up 
a Water Solidarity Fund aimed at helping the most needy to pay their water bills as well as a 
Sustainable Development Fund to fund works primarily in the water sector.” 
The new contract specifies inter alia that: 
• A mechanism will be set up to distribute productivity gains and contractual risks between the 
operator and the local authority.  
• A Dijon Water Solidarity Fund will be specially set up in cooperation with community social 
organizations to guarantee water supply to financially vulnerable families.  
• The creation of a Supervisory Board extends Dijon’s means of control. Chaired by a 
representative of Greater Dijon, the Board will comprise five representatives of Greater Dijon and five 
representatives of Lyonnaise des Eaux. Its role is to monitor, at regular intervals, how the contracts are 
progressing.  
• Greater Dijon will appoint an auditor for each reporting period, to review the technical and 
financial data required for preparing annual reports. The auditor will have access to all contractual 
data, especially financial data.  
• Greater Dijon’s water utility will be operated under a specific brand name to promote and 
highlight local governance. Innovating for healthy water and measuring its efficiency  
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5. Conclusion 
In this note, we stressed problems associated with the awarding of concession contracts. Since they are 
complex long-term contracts, they are also inherently incomplete agreements leading to award 
difficulties. This justifies the need for a specific Directive for concession contracts, different from the 
one concerning traditional public procurement.  
By setting up “rules of the game” for the awarding of concession contracts, the Directive is seeking 
for increasing competition and, in the end, the efficiency of public services organized through 
concession contracts.  
To achieve such a goal, we insist on the fact that the efficiency of concession contracts be 
considered throughout their entire effectiveness, that is to say focusing on the award process and their 
ex-post enforcement. In our point of view, this enforcement stage is not sufficiently taken into account 
in the actual proposal of the Directive. By eluding the fact that 1/ all concession contracts need to be 
renegotiated and 2/ complex award rules do not secure the selection of an efficient private firm, too 
much emphasis is put on rigid rules. 
The economic literature on concession contracts suggests that rigid award rules would not resolve 
important issues and is therefore not a good solution. Rigid rules would not solve strategic behaviours 
put in place by firms in order to avoid competition (i.e. low-balling strategies; collusive agreements) 
as well as errors made in offers by optimistic bidders (i.e. winner’s curse effect). In addition, empirical 
studies suggest that concession contracts are very often, if not always renegotiated (J.-L. Guasch 2004; 
Athias & Stéphane Saussier 2007; Brux et al. 2011; Engel et al. 2011). Renegotiations are the rule, not 
the exception and this should be taken into account in the Directive. 
What the theory and facts suggest is that there is no point establishing rigid rules for award 
procedures: this would not ensure fair competition between competitors and this would not favour 
efficiency in concession contracts because actors anticipate that such contracts are generally 
renegotiated ex post. Rigidifying renegotiations ex post would not be a solution either. It would bind 
partners in bad deals when contracts are misaligned with their environment, as would invariably occur 
(because they are incomplete long-term agreements).  
Instead, the theory and facts recommend establishing light rules for award procedures that, to a 
certain extent, would permit the use of the public authority’s discretionary power. It must be kept in 
mind that concession contracts are long-term agreements that need a partnership between the public 
entity and the private partner in order to be established. It would thus be reasonable to allow a more 
broad set of criteria at the award stage (e.g. reputation criteria) and to allow the public authority to 
disqualify offers that are clearly not suitable for establishing a long-term partnership. 
However, such a flexible framework should be coupled with greater transparency in order to avoid 
corruption and favouritism. When a large set of criteria as well as a part of the discretionary power for 
the public authority should be accepted at the award stage and renegotiations should be avoided as 
much as possible but also widely accepted when necessary at the execution stage, this should be made 
as transparent as possible. In our view, the main road to follow is to implement a transparent and fair 
renegotiation process within the contractual agreement, involving all stakeholders. We also suggest 
that more transparency can be obtained with mandatory annual reports for every public service, 
regardless of how they are provided to citizen (i.e. independently of the fact that they are provided by 
a public or a private entity).  Such transparency would generate pressure on the public authority as 
well as on private operators to increase their accountability. It would also frame clear rules of the 
game. Those points are crucial to benchmark results obtained in European countries more easily than it 
is the case now, to give incentives to European firms to bid outside of their own country. This would 
help to reduce national favouritism and to increase the number of offers received when public 
authorities are organizing call for tenders for their concessions.   
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To conclude, looking at empirical and theoretical studies on concession contracts, we believe that 
the Directive should: 
 Incorporate a larger set of criteria for award procedures (e.g. reputation criteria) 
 Be more flexible concerning the award stage (e.g. criteria should not be automatically weighted) 
 Be more flexible concerning the execution stage (e.g. renegotiations should be largely allowed) 
 Seek greater transparency at all stages in order to make public authorities more accountable. This 
would generate: 
 Greater confidence and incentives for European firms to bid for concessions outside 
of their own country 
 More competition (i.e. more bids received) for public authorities when they organize 
call for tenders. 
 Achieve greater transparency and accountability for example through: 
 The framing of the internal structure of the public works authority of state and local 
governments in order to split decision rights between a unit responsible for planning, 
project selection, and awarding projects, and an independent unit responsible for 
contract enforcement and the supervision of contract renegotiations 
 Contractual provisions within concessions contracts specifying that stakeholders will 
be represented at the renegotiation stages and will be informed 
 Mandatory public annual reports giving information about the price and quality of the 
service, with specific information on work done, underway or planned, as well as on 
debt. 
Examples, theoretical arguments as well as empirical feedbacks are provided in this report in order to 
feed this position. 
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